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PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE
DISCRIMINATION IN DEFERRED
COMPENSATION & PENSION PLANS
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of deferred compensation and pension plans is to
provide employees and self-employed individuals with future funds for
retirement income. Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 401 estab-
lishes the requirements for the qualification of those trusts or plans
which create a reserve fund to make future payments to employees and
self-employed individuals.' If the trust or plan qualifies under section
401, the employer can deduct current cash contributions to the trust
from gross income,2 and the income subsequently earned by the trust
will be exempt from taxation.3 Alternatively, the employer may,
purchase annuities for its employees under a plan which meets the sec-
tion 401 requirements and deduct the annuity premiums.4
Congress enacted the requirements of section 401 to preclude em-
ployers from creating plans which impermissibly discriminate in favor
of executives or highly compensated employees and to prevent the use
of the trust corpus or income for purposes other than the exclusive ben-
efit of the employees.5 This legislation has produced mixed results.
Some areas of impermissible discrimination have been alleviated by
the amendment of existing statutes or the creation of new statutes,6 by
judicial interpretation,7 or by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regula-
1. I.R.C. § 401.
2. I.R.C. § 404(a) provides in part:
GENERAL RULE-If contributions are paid by an employer to or under a stock
bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or if compensation is p aid or ac-
crued on account of any employee under a plan deferring the receipt of such com-
pensation, such contributions or compensation shall not be deductible under
section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses) or section 212 (relating to ex-
penses for the production of income); but, if they satisfy the conditions of either of
such sections, they shall be deductible under this section, subject. . . to. . . limi-
tations.
3. I.R.C. § 501(a).
4. I.R.C. § 404(a). A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing annu-
ities in deferred compensation and pension plans is beyond the scope of this comment.
5. H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8 (1974), reprintedin 1974-3 C.B. 244,251.
6. Eg., I.R.C. § 414(b) (treating all employees of those corporations considered to be
members of a controlled group of corporations as employed by a single employer).
7. E.g., Forsythe Emergency Serv. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 881, 890 (1977) (plan is
discriminatory unless it "operates for a fair cross section of all employees in general").
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tions. 8 However, discrimination still exists in deferred compensation
and pension plans. It is inherent in many of the statutes;9 it is inten-
tionally planned by many employers;' 0 and it is cause for plan disquali-
fication by the IRS, whether it occurs intentionally or inadvertently."
Only that discrimination deemed by the IRS to be "impermissible" dis-
qualifies a plan from tax exemption. The purpose of this comment is to
examine past and present permissible and impermissible discrimination
in deferred compensation and pension plans, to examine the criteria
used by the IRS to disqualify plans on the grounds of discrimination,
and to apply the criteria to future planning techniques.
II. INCENTIVES
Formal pension plans have been in existence in the United States
since 1875.12 With the advent of the Social Security System in the
1920's, private pension plans as a retirement planning technique exper-
ienced their first widespread popularity. 13 However, the striking
growth in their use has only occurred during the last few decades.
Since the early 1950's, deferred compensation plans for employees have
been one of the primary focuses of business planning because of their
extremely favorable tax consequences.14 More recently, the increasing
cost of financing pension plans, strict reporting requirements, ' and the
8. Eg., Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4 (1978) (concerning discrimination as to contributions or
benefits).
9. For example, a problem inherent in the integration of pension plans with Social
Security benefits is the allocation among employers of reductions for Social Security benefits
when using the offset method of integration. This method allows the employer to deduct his
required Social Security contribution from his contribution to each employee's plan. How-
ever, when a worker has more than one employer, it is possible for one of the employers to
use portions of the contributions made by other employers to provide himself with a larger
Social Security offset against the worker's pension than he is entitled to. Pension reductions
can thus exceed the amount of the Social Security benefit. This occurs because there is no
adequate method of attributing the Social Security benefit received by an employee to a
single employer. Testimony of Richard A. Kuzmack, President's Comm'n on Pension Pol-
icy (Oct. 10, 1979), reprintedin [1980] 5 PENS. PLAN. GUIDE (CCH) 25,308.
10. See text accompanying notes 54-75 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 126-36 infra.
12. Historians generally agree that the first formal pension plan in the United States was
established in 1875 by the American Express Company. See W. GREENOUGH & F. KING,
PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 26 (1976).
13. Rachlin, Effects of Social Security Changes and Carter's Proposed Integration
Changes, 4 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 225 (1978).
14. Eg., I.R.C. § 404 (contributions deductible by employer); I.R.C. §§ 402-403 (taxa-
tion on compensation deferred until receipt by beneficiary).
15. The burdensome filing requirements have even been extended to the state. Under
I.R.C. § 6058(a), state agencies which are pension plan sponsors are required to file informa-
tion returns. California v. Blumenthal, 457 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
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ever present threat of plan disqualification by the IRS 16 have detracted
from their desirability.
The tax incentives for funding a pension plan begin when a contri-
bution is made by the employer to a qualified plan, and the employer
receives a current deduction for the amount contributed. 7 The em-
ployee does not report the contribution as income until the funds are
actually distributed to him.'8 Thus, for a highly compensated em-
ployee, a pension plan can lower his current effective tax rate.' 9 Addi-
tionally, income earned through the investment of this fund is
accumulated tax-free resulting in the fund accumulating much more
rapidly.20 In effect, the federal government has given the employee an
interest-free loan by permitting the use of the "non-collected tax" to
generate additional revenue. Finally, when the employee does retire,
he will be taxed only on those disbursements actually made and usually
at a lower rate.2'
III. PRE-ERISA
22
Discrimination by employers under deferred compensation and
pension plans is not a new problem. Over the years, Congress has be-
come increasingly aware of this problem and has attempted to abate it.
In a message to Congress on June 1, 1937, President Roosevelt specifi-
cally addressed the need for legislative reform when he stated 'that the
tax exemption allowed to employers "ha[d] been twisted into a means
of tax avoidance by the creation of pension trust[s] which include[d] as
16. A pension plan will be disqualified by the IRS if it fails to meet any of the require-
ments for qualified plans. I.R.C. §§ 401-415. See text accompanying notes 126-36 infra.
17. I.R.C. § 404(a).
18. I.R.C. § 402 (taxability of beneficiary of employee's trust); I.R.C. § 403 (taxation of
employee annuities).
19. Since 1976, a highly compensated employee has had less of an advantage when de-
ferring compensation because I.R.C. § 1348 now limits a taxpayer's non-deferred compensa-
tion to a maximum marginal tax rate of 50% rather than the previous 70%. Effective for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1976, I.R.C. § 1348 applies to employee deduc-
tions from deferred compensation plans. H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 428
(1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1554.
20. I.R.C. § 501(a) provides an exemption from income taxation for organizations de-
scribed in § 501(c) or (d) and § 401(a).
21. After retirement, an individual's income generally will be reduced to a fraction of his
previous earnings. The tax rate on the distributions from the plan will, therefore, be sub-
stantially less than the tax the employee would have paid on that income in the year it was
contributed or earned.
22. In 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act was passed (hereinafter
ERISA). "Pre-ERISA" denotes the period prior to 1974. See notes 47-50 infra and
accompanying text.
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beneficiaries only small groups of officers and directors or employees in
the high income tax brackets."23 In response, Congress adopted a two-
fold approach to close the loopholes. Under former IRC section
401(a)(3), plans "qualified,"'24 and thus received tax advantages, if a
specified percentage of the firm's employees were eligible and partici-
pated,25 or if the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate found that
the eligibility requirements did not discriminate in favor of officers,
shareholders, supervisors, or "highly compensated employees.
26
In response to section 401, many different mechanisms were devel-
oped by employers to discriminate in favor of certain employees and
against others. Some of the mechanisms used factors like salary,
27
age,28 employee turnover,29 or years of service30 to discriminate in
23. 81 CONG. REc. 5125 (1937) (President's Message to Congress).
24. A plan is deemed "qualified" if it meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 401. The fund,
trust, or plan is then treated as an exempt organization; employer's contributions to it are
deductible and its income is accumulated tax-free.
25. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 410(b) (1974)) provided:
A trust. . . forming part of a... pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer
. . . shall constitute a qualified trust under this section-
(3) if the trust... benefits either-
(A) 70 percent or more of all employees or 80 percent or more of all
employees who are eligible to benefit under the plan ....
26. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)(B) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 410(b) (1974)) provided that
a trust qualified if it benefited employees who "qualiflied] under a classification set up by the
employer and found by the Secretary or his delegate not to be discriminatory in favor of
employees who are officers, shareholders, persons whose principal duties consist in supervis-
ing the work of other employees or highly compensated employees."
The terms "highly compensated" and "lower compensated" are relative, and the dis-
tinction between them must be based upon the circumstances of each case. Rev. Rul. 56-
497, 1956-2 C.B. 284, 286. "Highly compensated" is defined under ERISA in I.R.C.
§ 401(k)(4) to mean "any employee who is more highly compensated than two-thirds of all
eligible employees."
27. Plans which compute benefits on the basis of wages are not discriminatory if they
"bear a uniform relationship to the total compensation" of each employee. I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(5).
28. I.R.C. §§ 410(a)(1)(A),(3)(A) provide that a qualified plan cannot exclude an other-
wise eligible employee who has attained a minimum age of twenty-five or completed a
twelve-month period of not less than 1,000 hours of service, whichever occurs later. How-
ever, this one year of service requirement can be extended to three years, provided the em-
ployee is 100% vested upon entry into the plan. I.R.C. § 410(a)(1) (B)(i). Thus, an employer
can fix its plan's eligibility requirements and vesting schedule on the basis of its workers'
(youthful v. non-youthful) ages and rate of turnover, in order to minimize the number of
employees covered or the amount of benefits that each eligible employee will receive.
I.R.C. § 410(a)(2) prohibits the exclusion of employees on the basis of age. However, it
permits a plan with a normal retirement age of sixty-five to exclude employees who join the
company within five years or less of retirement. Although this appears to be age discrimina-
tion, in Opinion Letters No. 304.1 and 404 of the Wage-Hour Administration (Feb. 9, 1970),
the Administration specifically held that the exclusion of older employees from a bona fide
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favor of highly compensated employees.
Section 401(a)(5) states that a plan shall not be considered discrim-
inatory "merely because it is limited to salaried or clerical employees,"
yet, some plans covering only salaried employees may be considered
discriminatory.3 In Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling
Corp. ,32 the plan covered only the salaried employees, and excluded
the hourly employees. The Commissioner held that the plan impermis-
sibly discriminated because the "more highly" compensated employees
were being favored over other employees. On appeal, the Tax Court
held that because the pay differential between the lowest paid individ-
ual in the covered group (salaried) and the highest paid individual in
the non-covered group (hourly) was only $1,000 per year, the covered
group could not rationally be regarded as " 'highly paid.' -31 On subse-
quent appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, re-
versed, stating that the plan impermissibly discriminated in favor of
salaried employees and against hourly paid employees. 34 The court
agreed with the Commissioner's interpretation of "highly compen-
sated" as meaning "more highly compensated" and held that his inter-
pretation was not an abuse of his powers.35
In another pre-ERISA case, Ryan School Retirement Trust v. Com-
missioner,36 the Tax Court held that a pension plan which utilized the
employee turn-over rate to provide the executives with proportionately
more benefits was not impermissibly discriminatory.37 Originally, only
8.4% of the corpus of the trust was credited to the five officers and
benefit plan cannot violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1976), because the policy of that Act was to prohibit discrimination in hiring.
Therefore, under I.R.C. § 410(a)(2), an employer may permissibly structure its workpool to
include more elderly employees without having its plan disqualified for not including them.
29. Eg., Ryan School Retirement Trust v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 127 (1955) (dispro-
portionate benefits favoring officers held nondiscriminatory when the result of unforeseen
employee turnover).
30. E.g., McMenamy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1057 (1970), af d, 442 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.
1971) (plan formula based on each employee's number of years of service to corporation was
discriminatory where the formula was adopted to favor only sole shareholder-officer).
3 1. For a review of the basic problems of qualifying a salaried only plan, see Rev. Rul.
79-337, 1979-2 C.B. 189; Rev. Rul. 66-15, 1966-1 C.B. 83; Rev. Rul. 66-14, 1966-1 C.B. 75;
Rev. Rul. 66-13, 1966-1 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 66-12, 1966-1 C.B. 72.
32. 399 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1968).
33. Id. at 392. The Second Circuit Court's opinion looks particularly suspect in light of
the IRS's definition of "highly compensated" as a comparison of the covered versus the
uncovered employees in Larsons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 773, 782 (1978).
34. 399 F.2d at 393-94.
35. Id.
36. 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
37. Id. at 134.
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91.6% was credited to the remaining 110 lower level employees. How-
ever, within seven years, the five officers' interest in the trust fund in-
creased to 58%, while the remaining employees' interest decreased to
42%; the change in percentages was directly attributable to forfeit-
ures. 8 The court held that the prohibited group, composed of manage-
ment and key employees, had legitimately derived substantial benefits
under the plan through forfeitures because the number of forfeitures
was unforeseeable.39 The court found that the plan operated to give
permanent employees a preferred position over nonpermanent employ-
ees and that this was not the type of discrimination prohibited by the
statute.40 Therefore, as a general rule, when the purpose and effect of a
plan's eligibility requirements are to avoid the immediate coverage of
nonpermanent employees, the classification will not technically, ac-
cording to the courts, be discriminatory.
In McMenamy v. Commissioner,4 the Tax Court considered the
validity of a pension profit-sharing plan in which employer contribu-
tions were allocated among the participants on a combined basis of
compensation and years of service. By giving credit for all past service,
the sole shareholder-officer was assured of receiving a much more
favorable allocation than any other participant because he had accu-
mulated the most years of service. However, the court held that the
adoption of a contribution allocation formula known to favor a sole
shareholder was discriminatory under section 401(a)(4).4z
The most controversial scheme under the pre-ERISA code sections
involved the use of affiliated corporations.43 Under this scheme, the
corporate head was dissected from the corporate body. Management
and key employees were employed by one corporation which provided
a very generous deferred compensation or pension plan. Rank and file
members were employed by a separate service corporation, which pro-
vided little or no such plans. Business was then conducted pursuant to
38. A forfeiture is a loss of pension rights that occurs upon a voluntary or involuntary
termination when the employee has failed to meet the minimum vesting requirements of the
plan.
39. 24 T.C. at 134.
40. Id. Accord, Lansons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 773, 784 (1978). See also,
Scudere, Tax Court's ".atest"Nondiscriminatory Classfcation Test-Balancing the Equities,
4 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 150, 153 (1978).
41. 54 T.C. 1057 (1970), a 'd, 442 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1971).
42. Id. at 1064. The taxpayer-sole shareholder should have known better than to be so
greedy. Revenue Ruling 68-303 states that the IRS will assume that a self-employed indi-
vidual is "highly compensated," thus making the taxpayer's plan inherently suspect. Rev.
Rul. 68-303, 1968-1 C.B. 165.
43. See, e.g., Kiddie v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 1055, 1056 (1978).
[Vol. 14
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a contract where the management corporation hired the service corpo-
ration. Although not all attempts to use multiple corporations man-
aged to avoid being deemed discriminatory and therefore disqualified
under the statute,' the IRS was deeply concerned with those that did.
This concern caused the IRS to render opinions that unfairly combined
or "attributed" employees of one business entity to another entity to
determine whether a pension plan qualified.45 More often than not, the
dissimilarities in the attributed businesses would cause the plan to be
disqualified.46
IV. DISCRIMINATION UNDER ERISA
In order to stop taxpayer evasion of the anti-discrimination provi-
sions and to provide the taxpayer with an objective test for determining
whether entities were affiliated, the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA) was enacted.47
Congress trumpeted the introduction of ERISA as the mechanism
that would eradicate the prior abuses of the anti-discrimination provi-
sions in the pre-ERISA Internal Revenue Code sections:
This legislation is concerned with improving the fairness and
effectiveness of qualified retirement plans in their vital role of
providing retirement income. In broad outline, the objective
is to increase the number of individuals participating in em-
ployer-financed plans; to make sure to the greatest extent pos-
sible that those who do participate in such plans actually
receive benefits and do not lose their benefits as a result of
unduly restrictive forfeiture provisions or failure of the pen-
sion plan to accumulate and retain sufficient funds to meet its
44. See, e.g., Burnetta v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 387 (1977). Burnetta involved a profes-
sional medical corporation that hired its shareholder-incorporators. Its office staff was ob-
tained through a wholly independent corporation called Staff, Inc., to whom the professional
corporation paid an amount equal to the aggregate salary of the office staff. The profes-
sional corporation also handled the daily supervision, bookkeeping and taxes relating to the
staff, and instructed Staff, Inc. on all personnel changes. The Tax Court held that the pen-
sion plan established by the professional corporation discriminated against the office staff,
whom the court found were the professional corporation's common law employees. Id. at
398.
45. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-370, 1968-2 C.B. 174 (employees were attributed by IRS for
determining plan's qualified status to each partner of the joint venture even though employ-
ees never performed services for the individual partners).
46. Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). Unfortunately for the taxpayer, the loophole that
Congress sought to close may not have really been a loophole. See text accompanying notes
130-36 infra; Lynch, How the Festering Problems of Section 414 are Frustrating Reasonable
Business Needs, 4 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 369 (1978).
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obligations; and to make the tax laws relating to qualified re-
tirement plans fairer by providing greater equality of treat-
ment under such plans for the different taxpayer groups
concerned.48
The changes brought about by ERISA were many49 and the effects
immediate.5" One major impact of the new changes was on affiliated
and controlled entities, which were now required to comply with the
"objective" discrimination test of section 410.51 Section 410(b)'s objec-
tive test set forth the following minimum participation standards:
ELIGIBILITY:
(1) In general.-A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust
under section 401(a) unless the trust, or two or more trusts, or
the trust or trusts and annuity plan or plans are designated by
the employer as constituting parts of a plan intended to qual-
ify under section 401(a) which benefits either-
(A) 70 percent or more of all employees, or 80 percent
or more of all the employees who are eligible to benefit under
the plan if 70 percent or more of all the employees are eligible
to benefit under the plan, excluding in each case employees
who have not satisfied the minimum age and service require-
ments, if any, prescribed by the plan as a condition of partici-
pation, or
(B) such employees as qualify under a classification set
up by the employer and found by the Secretary not to be dis-
criminatory in favor of employees who are officers, sharehold-
ers, or highly compensated.52
While ERISA eliminated many of the abuses that had previously
48. H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 48, reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 244, 251.
49. One such change was that members of a collective bargaining unit (e.g. unions) were
not to be considered by the IRS in calculating the statutory formula for determining dis-
crimination in an employer's plan. I.R.C. § 410(b)(2)(A). Thus, if an employer had union
and non-union employees, only the non-union employees would have to be covered under
the corporation's plan.
50. During the first three years after the enactment of ERISA, over 470,000 pension
plans covering 35 million employees and 1.1 million welfare plans covering an estimated 75
million employees were revised to meet ERISA requirements. Dunigan, ERISA Mk/ire-The
SmallEmployer, 4 J. PEN S. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 252, 252 (1978). Yet, many plans failed
to meet these new requirements. "IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz recently testified before
a congressional subcommittee that as many as 30% of the nation's 500,000 private pension
plans may have gone out of business since ERISA was enacted." 124 CONG. REC. S461-63
(daily ed. Jan. 25, 1978) (Study of the Effects of ERISA on Private Pension Plans in Indiana
by Sen. Lugar of Indiana).
51. I.R.C. § 414(c); Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2 (1975).
52. I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)'s objective test was previously codified in § 401(c)(3) (1954).
[Vol. 14
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gone unchecked, it also allowed other abuses. While most employers
amended their plans to comply with ERISA,53 others quickly took ad-
vantage of the weaknesses in the new "objective" discrimination test.
In Garland v. Commissioner,54 Doctors Garland and Dunn, as in-
dividuals, dissolved their partnership. Thereafter, Dr. Garland formed
a professional corporation, in which he was the sole employee. A sec-
ond partnership was then formed with 50 percent of the interest held by
Dr. Dunn and 50 percent of the interest held by Dr. Garland's profes-
sional corporation. For a flat fee, the partnership maintained the office
and equipment and provided the office staff. Initially, the pension plan
adopted by the professional association included Dr. Garland and the
employees of the partnership." However, after the enactment of ER-
ISA in 1974, the plan was amended to eliminate the partnership's em-
ployees. 6
Garland requested a ruling on the plan's qualified status from the
IRS. Although the plan was initially approved, the IRS subsequently
disqualified it57 for failure to include the partnership's employees as
required by Revenue Ruling 68-370.58 Revenue Ruling 68-370 basi-
cally sets forth the aggregation tests used by the IRS in determining
when employees of a joint venture or partnership are to be included
under a corporate-partner's pension plan. Garland appealed the IRS
53. See note 50 supra.
54. 73 T.C. 5 (1979).
55. The contributions made on behalf of the employees were based on the association's
share of the total compensation paid to those employees. Id. at 7 n.2.
56. Id. at 7. The plan was amended to eliminate the partnership's employees in order to
funnel all of the contributions and benefits to Dr. Garland.
57. Id. The Tax Court stated:
[T]he National Office issued a ruling which stated that the association and the
partnership were not under common control as defined in section 414(c) and the
regulations thereunder. Consequently, the partnership employees were not to be
considered the employees of the association in determining whether the associa-
tion's plan met the coverage requirements of sections 401(a)(4) and 410(b)(1).
However, on September 30, 1976, the National Office limited the scope of the rul-
ing by stating that it was directed only at the specific issue of whether the plan ran
afoul of sections 401(a)(4) and 410(b)(1) by virtue of section 414(c), and that it did
not consider the effect of Revenue Ruling 68-370, 1968-2 C.B. 174.
Id. (footnote omitted).
58. 73 T.C. at 6-7. Rev. Rul. 68-370, 1968-2 C.B. 174, provides in part:
The joint venture of the two corporations is a partnership within the meaning
of sections 761(a) and 7707(a)(2) of the Code. A partnership is not itself a taxable
entity for Federal income tax purposes but rather is merely the aggregate of the
constituent partners. . . . Once the requisite employment relationship is estab-
lished between the partnership and the individuals who are rendering services to
the partnership, such relationship is also established between each corporate part-
ner and the employees for purposes of sections 401 through 404 of the Code. ...
The sole effect of such conclusion is to attribute to each partner the employment
relationship that exists between the partnership and the individuals.
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ruling, contending that subsections 414(b) and (c), which were en-
acted after Revenue Ruling 68-370, provided the proper and exclusive
aggregation tests.5 9 Subsections 414(b) and (c) provide that employees
of trades or businesses which are under "common control" shall be
treated as employed by a single employer.6 °
The Tax Court held that Revenue Ruling 68-370 was inapplica-
ble.61 On the basis of a committee report showing clear legislative in-
tent,62 the court held that subsections 414(b) and (c) were the
exclusive means for determining whether employees of related trades
or businesses should be aggregated for purposes of applying the anti-
discrimination provisions. ' 63 However, the court concluded that the
plan at issue in Garland was not prohibited by those sections or their
respective regulations64 because: 1) there was no parent-subsidiary re-
lationship because the association did not own 80% of the partner-
ship;65 2) there was no brother-sister relationship because the
association had only 50% ownership and therefore lacked "effective
control; ' 66 and 3) there was no "combined group" relationship because
there were only two organizations involved rather than the statutorily
required three or more.67 As a result, Garland's borderline legitimate
plan had run the IRS gauntlet and survived.
Garland and its pre-ERISA predecessor, Kiddie v. Commissioner,68
exposed the different approaches taken by the IRS and the Tax Court
concerning affiliated employers in pension planning. The IRS's posi-
tion under the pre-ERISA statutes emphasized substance over form us-
ing the "fishy smell" test.69 This test meant that regardless of the form,
59. 73 T.C. at 11.
60. The temporary regulations which define "common control" are modeled after
the controlled group provisions in I.R.C. § 1563(a). See I.R.C. § 414(b); Treas. Reg.
§ 11.414(c)-2 (1975).
61. Garland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 5, 13 (1979). The Tax Court followed the same
reasoning previously used in Thomas Kiddie, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 1055
(1978) (partnership employees not attributable to the two partners, which were professional
corporations).
62. Garland, 73 T.C. at 12, (referring to H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974),
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670).
63. Garland, 73 T.C. at 13.
64. Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2 (1975).
65. 73 T.C. at 10-Il; see Treas. Reg. § ll.414(c)-2(b) (1975).
66. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2(c) (1975).
67. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2(d) (1975).
68. 69 T.C. 1055 (1978) (under identical factual circumstances, court upheld use of mul-
tiple professional corporations, where each had a pension plan that covered only the incor-
porator and not the employees).
69. The substance over form doctrine provides that, for tax purposes, the substance or
Vol. 14
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plans were disqualified if something in them looked suspicious to the
IRS.
In a break from tradition," the Tax Court's position in this area
was directly contrary to that of the IRS. The Tax Court, in Garland,
strictly interpreted the statutes based on legislative intent, resulting in
decisions favoring the taxpayers.7"
To stop taxpayer avoidance of the qualified pension plan require-
ments through multiple entities, Congress responded with ERISA to
close what it considered to be loopholes.72 ERISA was also enacted to
eliminate the vagueness and subjectivity of the IRS's "fishy smell" test
by providing an objective test.73 Despite this test, the IRS has contin-
ued to use the "fishy smell" test and to emphasize substance over
reality of a transaction shall control over the form in which the transaction is cast by the
taxpayer. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
70. It is an unstated fact that the Tax Court typically follows the IRS's position.
71. 73 T.C. at 12-13.
It is apparent from the committee report [H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1] that Congress was aware that prior to the enactment of ERISA it was
possible to circumvent the antidiscrimination provisions through the use of related
usiness entities. To safeguard against this possibility, Congress enacted legisla-
tion which establishes a straightforward, objective test for determining whether the
employees of affiliated entities should be treated as employed by a single employer.
Under this test, the employees will be so treated if the business entities are found to
be under common control as defined in regulations based on controlled group prin-
ciples. In light of this direct congressional response to the employee attribution
problem and the express statement of intent to clarify this matter for the future . .
we see no reason to [add the more stringent tests proposed by the Commissioner to
the already existing provisions of § 414(c)].
Id. at 13. See Scudere, Will the IRS Acquiesce to Kiddie and Garland, 6 J. Pens. Plan. &
Compliance 66, 66 (1980).
72. Before ERISA, though one corporation was related via ownership to another corpo-
ration, neither corporation was prohibited from adopting a separate pension or profit-shar-
ing plan for its own employees. Congress viewed this as a "loophole" because one plan
could be highly favorable to key employees and the other only marginally favorable to rank
• and file employees. Unfortunately, this "loophole" was not totally a loophole. The bi-plan
system was needed when the ownership of two entities was similar, but the businesses dis-
similar. For example, a doctor who has professionally incorporated himself and who also
owns a fast-food franchise would not normally be expected to include the fast-food employ-
ees, who have a plan, in his professional corporation's plan. However, under section 414
and its regulations, that same fast-food franchise's plan would be combined with the profes-
sional corporation's plan by the IRS for determining overall plan qualification. Because the
plans would obviously be different, by aggregating them, they would both be disqualified as
discriminatory. Thus, by closing the "loophole," Congress has succeeded in aggregating and
disqualifying the pension plans of businesses which deal in unrelated areas. See Lynch,
How the Festering Problems of Section 414 are Frustrating Reasonable Business Needs, 4 J.
PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 369, 370-71 (1978).
73. The objective test is contained in I.R.C. § 410(b) which states that a plan must cover
70% or more of all employees or 80% or more of the eligible employees if at least 70% are
eligible. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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form.
7 4
A. Impermissible Discrimination Under ERISA
Under ERISA and other related tax sections, qualified pension
plans will still be disqualified if found to be discriminatory in contribu-
tions or benefits.
Although not argued by the Commission in Garland, the IRS cer-
tainly could argue that if an individual is considered an employee
under the relevant sections of the Employment Tax Regulations,7" then
that individual should be considered an employee under pension plans.
The Employment Tax Regulations provide that an employment rela-
tionship exists when the person for whom the services are performed
has a right to control and direct the manner, efforts, and results of the
individual performing the services.76 Although this would not have
changed the result in Garland, due to the presumably exclusive test for
affiliated corporations under section 414(b) and (c), the Employment
Tax Regulations do lend credibility to the Commissioner's substance
over form argument, which the Tax Court may someday accept.
Another form of discrimination that has been deemed impermissi-
ble in pension plans consists of formulas which determine contribu-
tions on the combined basis of compensation and years of service,
where it is blatantly obvious that the key employees, shareholders, or
highly paid individuals will benefit unfairly."
Some stock bonus plans have also been held to be impermissibly
discriminatory. In Friedman and .Jobusch, Architects & Engineers v.
Commissioner,78 the Tax Court79 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals"° found that the corporation's stock bonus plan was discrimina-
tory in form under IRS sections 401(a)(4)(A),(B) and (C), because of
the independent restrictions on stock transfers which favored the prin-
cipal shareholder-officers. The articles of incorporation and the stock
74. E.g., Garland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 5 (1979).
75. Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121, 31.3306, 31.3401 (1975).
76. For purposes of federal employment taxes, the usual common law rules ordinarily
apply in determining whether the employer-employee relationship exists, and if so, who the
employer is. The regulations identify employers as persons who employ employees, Treas.
Reg. §§ 31.3121(d)-2, 31.3306(a)-I (1975), and as any person for whom services are per-
formed as an employee, Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(d)-l (1975). Rev. Rul. 75-41, 1975-1 C.B. 323.
77. Bernard McMenamy Contractor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1971)
(plan disqualified where combined years of service and compensation formula resulted in
officers and shareholders receiving benefits in excess of pay differential).
78. 627 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1980).
79. 68 T.C. 929, 940 (1977).
80. 627 F.2d at 177.
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certificates gave the corporation the option of purchasing at "book
value" the stock of any employee transferring shares or terminating
employment. However, under a separate stock purchase agreement,
the corporation was required to repurchase the shares of theprincipal
shareholders-officers upon their death at an "adjusted book value."
"Adjusted book value, unlike book value, included goodwill in the
computation of the corporation's assets.""1 This difference in the re-
purchase provisions, according to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
was sufficient to cause the entire plan to be considered impermissibly
discriminatory, resulting in disqualification. 2
Probably the strangest case in which impermissible discrimination
was found was Olmo v. Commissioner.3 In 01mo, the corporation's
principal business was dentistry. Dr. Rubach was the president and
Dr. Olmo was the vice-president. Both were 50% shareholders and em-
ployees of the corporation. The corporation maintained two plans, a
money purchase pension plan and a profit sharing plan. The plans re-
quired that an employee, in order to participate, be both twenty-two
and one-half years old and have at least nine months of service. One of
the company's four employees failed to qualify due to the age require-
ment. The other three were fully eligible to participate, but one volun-
tarily waived participation. This resulted in only two members, Dr.
Olmo and Dr. Rubach, being covered by the plan.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS that the plans were discrimi-
natory, stating:
The unexplained failure to include anyone except members of
the prohibited group as participants in the plans when there
are two other full-time employees who could have been cov-
ered is inconsistent with the Congressional purpose underly-
ing the qualification of deferred compensation plans of
providing for the general welfare of employees.8 4
81. Id.
82. Id. The reason for the difference in the two provisions is obvious. The two principal
incorporator-members probably owned sufficient stock to control their respective firms and
desired their families to receive the premium which market investors would be willing to pay
over book value for "control." Additionally, because the "goodwill" or inherent value of the
ongoing enterprise was directly due to their efforts and the risks taken to create the enter-
prise, they probably felt that being paid for the goodwill in the corporation was just. Be-
cause the employees did not take the risks, put forth the effort, nor have the "control" that
would merit a premium, their stock was only worth book value. In spite of the realities, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Tax Court held that these differences in the repur-
chase provisions were discriminatory and disqualified the whole plan.
83. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112 (1979).
84. Id. at 1117.
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Thus, the plans were found to be discriminatory not because the two
principal shareholder-employees had intentionally favored themselves,
but because the only truly eligible employee voluntarily opted not to
participate.8 5 The court noted that while the dentists did not control
the individual's act of waiving participation, they did "control the
forms of the plans," and could foresee that they woulA be the only ones
covered.8 6 To be non-discriminatory, the plans would have had to
have required mandatory participation. The irony of this case is that
the Tax Court was aware that even if the employee had not waived her
right to participate, she would not have received any benefits under the
plan as a participant because when she finally terminated she was zero-
vested.87
Olmo involved a taxable year subject to the pre-ERISA rules. ER-
ISA introduced the concept of Individual Retirement Arrangements
(IRAs)88 which allows the employee to establish his or her own private
retirement plan. Commenting on the possible use of IRAs, the Tax
Court in Olmo stated:
Under ERISA, . . . an employee who is an "active partici-
pant" in a qualified plan may not contribute to an individual
retirement arrangement. Sec[tion] 219(b)(2). Waivers of par-
ticipation by potential participants who prefer individual re-
tirement arrangements to plan coverage may under ERISA be
more convincingly tied to the interests of the employee rather
than was [the employee's] waiver here. We do not intend to
suggest that a waiver of participation for such bona fide pur-
poses will, under ERISA, tend to make an otherwise qualify-
ing plan discriminatory.89
However, in a recent case subject to ERISA,90 the Tax Court and the
IRS held that a corporation's plan was impermissibly discriminatory
when two of the three eligible employees voluntarily waived participa-
tion in the plan to establish their own IRAs.
B. Permissible Discrimination Under EASA
The Social Security System has always been highly discriminatory
85. Id. at 1118.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1117. Zero-vested refers to the fact that at termination, the employee is not
entitled to any benefits due to the employee's failure to meet the plan's eligibility require-
ments.
88. I.R.C. § 219(b)(2).
89. 38 T.C.M. at 1117 n.7.
90. Calcedo Construction Corp. v. Commissioner, No. 80-2250 (T.C., filed June 5, 1980).
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in favor of the lower-paid employees.9' However, Social Security ben-
efits have never been sufficient even for the rank and file, thus necessi-
tating the need for a tax-subsidized private pension system. To
encourage the private business sector to adopt pension plans, certain
methods of permissible discrimination have been devised by Congress,
which allow an employer to disproportionately favor key employees
and executives. One such method is integration.
Integration is a concept whereby the present Social Security Sys-
tem allocation is combined with the individual employer's plan. The
concept was introduced in 1942 by Congress and has evolved through
regulations and rulings by the Treasury Department for the express
purpose of discriminating in favor of key employees, to offset the dis-
proportionately small rewards received by them under the Social Se-
curity System.92 Under integration, a plan is not discriminatory if. (1)
it excludes employees earning less than the Social Security wage base;
(2) it is limited to salaried or clerical employees; (3) it relates benefits or
contributions strictly to compensation levels; or (4) it provides for dif-
ferent levels of benefits or contributions above and below the wage
base.93 Thus, the net effect of integration is to allow a larger percentage
of contributions or benefits to be received by highly compensated em-
ployees than would otherwise be possible under a qualified retirement
plan.
A simple example can be used to illustrate the basic theory of inte-
gration and its value in tax planning.9 4 Assume that a profit-sharing
91. The reason why the Social Security percentages are so skewed in favor of the lower
income earners is that the system is aimed at providing only one basic level of retirement
income for all strata of workers. This results in lower income workers receiving a higher
percentage of their annual compensation in retirement benefits, and higher income workers
receiving a smaller percentage.
92. Rachlin, Effects of Social Security Changes and Carter's Proposed Integration
Changes, 4 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 225, 226 (1978).
93. Boynton & Mahoney, Statement ofAmerican Academy ofActuaries, 4 J. PENS. PLAN.
& COMPLIANCE 298, 300 (1978).
94. Definitions for the terms used in the example are:
Taxable Wage Base: the maximum amount of earnings during a year which may be
considered wages for that year under I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1). For example, the taxable wage
base for 1980 was $25,900.
Covered Compensation: that portion of an individual's annual compensation to which
old age and survivor's insurance benefits will be provided under the Social Security Act
when an individual's total annual compensation is at least equal to the taxable wage base for
that year.
Integration Level: an employer-designated level of compensation, above which addi-
tional benefits or contributions are made by the employer. Each employee's compensation
in excess of the level is used in the computation, with each employee receiving benefits or
contributions in proportion to their excess. Below the integration level, the only benefits and
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plan has an integration level of $9,000 and employer contributions allo-
cated to the plan are credited first to the accounts of those employees
who earn over $9,000, up to a maximum of 7% of that portion of their
compensation over this amount. The plan has three employees-A, B
and C-who annually earn $50,000, $10,000 and $6,000, respectively.
Their total annual compensation is $66,000.91 Using a 10% contribu-
tion factor, $6,600 is the total sum contributed by the employer each
year. This amount will be allocated to the participants' accounts in two
steps:
(1) the amount of each employee's compensation over the inte-
gration level of $9,000 is. determined. Only A and B earn more than
$9,000. After subtracting $9,000 from each of their salaries and com-
bining the differences the total excess amount of compensation A and B
earn is $42,000.96 Seven percent of $42,000 is $2,940 of which $2,870
will be allocated to A's account and $70 will be allocated to B's ac-
count.
97
(2) the total amount allocated under Step 1, $2,940, is subtracted
from the total employer contribution, $6,600, in order to determine the
amount to be allocated to all participants. The difference, $3,660, will
then be allocated among all the participants in proportion to the total
compensation earned.
Amount of Each Employee's Total
Individual Percentage Allocation
Employees' of All Compensa- Step I Step 2 to Each Percent
Compensation tion Earned Allocation Allocation98  Employee Allocated
A. $50,000 75.75% $2,870 $2,773 $5,643 85.50%
B. $10,000 15.16% $ 70 $ 554 $ 624 9.45%
C. $ 6,000 9.09% $ 0 $ 333 $ 333 5.05%
$66,000 100.00% $2,940 $3,660 $6,600 100.00%
Had the plan not been integrated, the "Percent Allocated" would have
equalled "Each Employee's Percentage of All Compensation Earned,"
contributions that employees receive are determined by Social Security. For example, a
defined contribution plan is integrated at the $9,000 level when it provides additional em-
ployer contributions for employees only as to that part of their compensation in excess of
$9,000 annually. Similarly, a defined benefit plan is integrated at the $5,000 level when it
provides a certain benefit level for all employees, but reduces that benefit level by a certain
percentage for "covered compensation" which is less than $5,000.
95. $50,000 + $10,000 + $6,000 = $66,000.
96. $50,000 - $9,000 = $41,000 and $10,000 - $9,000 = $1,000; $41,000 + $1,000 =
$42,000.
97. The figures for A and B reflect their proportionate excess amounts: 41/42 for A and
1/42 for B.
98. The Step 2 figures reflect the employer's contribution to each employee based on
each employee's total earned compensation.
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and A, B and C would each have received benefits in proportion to
their compensation. When the corresponding Social Security benefits
are added in (39% for A, 75% for B, and 86% for C), the need to use
integration as an offset mechanism is demonstrated. 99 Thus, if there is
no integration and independent distributions are made from the private
pension plan and Social Security, the more highly compensated em-
ployees will receive substantially less than if the plan is integrated.
Integration thus provides the employer with a legitimate means of
discriminating in favor of highly compensated employees as long as the
required Social Security contributions for all employees are made. As
a general rule of planning to achieve maximum discrimination in favor
of those employees with higher compensation, the integration level
should just exceed the compensation of the employees against whom
discrimination is desired.l °°
Beyond integration, there are other subtle forms of discrimination.
For example, the courts have held that discrimination against non-per-
manent employees is permissible.10 1 Thus, the allocation of forfeiture,
which are losses in pension rights which occur when employees termi-
nate their employment prior to meeting the minimum vesting require-
ments of the plan, is a permissible discriminatory source. Forfeitures
allocated in proportion to the pension plan account balance of only the
vested employees tend to discriminate in favor of officers, shareholder-
employees and other key employees. These employees tend to have a
lower rate of job turnover which naturally results in their having much
larger accumulated pension plan account balances than rank and file
employees.
Vesting provisions °1 provide another means of permissible dis-
crimination. ERISA requires a pension plan sponsor to select one of
three vesting provisions to satisfy the minimum vesting require-
ments.10 3 The first provides for full vesting after ten years of service. 104
The second, involving gradual vesting, provides for twenty-five percent
vesting after five years of service, increasing five percent per year for
99. Boynton & Mahoney, Statement ofAmerican Academy ofActuaries, 4 J. PENS. PLAN.
& COMPLIANCE 299, 317 (1978).
100. M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS, § 10.3 at 270 (1977).
101. Ryan School Retirement Trust v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 127 (1955). See text ac-
companying notes 36-40, supra.
102. "Vested" refers to an employee's fixed right to enjoy specific property after satisfying
the eligibility requirements of a plan, eg. , retirement benefits, upon that person's termina-
tion from employment.
103. I.R.C. §§ 411(a)(2)(A)-411(a)(2)(C).
104. I.R.C. § 41 1(a)(2)(A).
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the next five years and ten percent per year for the following five
years.105 The third ERISA vesting standard is known as the "rule of
45."' 106 This rule provides for fifty percent vesting after either ten years
of service or when the combination of years of service (minimum of
five years) and the employee's age totals forty-five, whichever occurs
first. Thereafter, the employee's vested interest increases ten percent
per year for the next five years.
Depending upon a business' rate of employee termination, the real
differences inherent in each of the three standards become an impor-
tant vehicle for permissible discrimination. 10 7 For instance, if the sup-
port staff tends to be less than forty-five years old and tends to leave
within five years or less, then they will be less likely to vest because
their totals do not each equal or exceed 45. Thus, the rule of 45 can be
an important planning device for the employer.
A method which is not primarily used for discrimination, but
which is increasingly being utilized to provide highly compensated em-
ployees with increased benefits, is the combined use of defined contri-
bution plans,' such as money purchase or profit sharing plans, with
defined benefit plans. 109 Under the IRC, if a corporation has both a
profit sharing plan and a money purchase or defined benefit pension
plan, the maximum deduction for corporate income taxes is 25% of the
aggregate compensation of all plan participants.' 10 However, this limi-
tation does not apply if the corporation maintains a defined contribu-
tion plan and a defined benefit pension plan, without including the
profit sharing plan. The tax incentive gained by removing the 25% de-
duction limit is obvious. By combining a defined contribution plan
with a defined benefit plan, the only limit that the employer is subject
to is the "1.4 Rule."'' 1
105. LR.C. § 411(a)(2)(B).
106. I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(C).
107. For a discussion of the differences, see Sahin & Balcer, ERISA Vesting Standards-
Is There a Choice?, 6 J. PENs. PLAN. & COMPLIANcE 309 (1980).
108. Defined contribution plans have the common characteristic of predetermined (or
discretionary) formulas geared to contributions, rather than to retirement benefits. The
money purchase pension plan and the profit sharing plan are the most common types of
defined contribution plans. Money purchase pension plans contain fixed contribution for-
mulas (e.g., 10% of the participant's compensation) and obligate the corporation to make
annual contributions regardless of profits. On the other hand, corporate contributions to
profit sharing plans do not obligate the corporation to make contributions each year; contri-
butions need only be made when there are current or accumulated profits.
109. Defined benefit plans are geared to provide the beneficiary with a fixed retirement
benefit, regardless of the amount of contributions that are needed to achieve that benefit.
110. I.R.C. § 404(a)(7).
111. I.R.C. § 415(e)(1) provides:
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For example, suppose that a doctor incorporates himself in 1975
and receives $150,000 annual compensation. By 1977, his business is
well established, so he begins a money purchase pension plan to shelter
some of his income. In that first year of the corporation's money
purchase pension plan, the maximum annual addition for 1977,
$28,175, was made. In 1978, the maximum annual addition for that
year, $30,050, is also made. For purposes of utilizing the "1.4 Rule,"
the defined contribution fraction would be computed as follows:
Year Actual Contribution Maximum Contribution
1975 ........ $ 0 $ 25,000
1976 ........ 0 26,825
1977 ........ 28,175 28,175
1978 ........ 30,050 30,050
Total $ 58,225 $ 110,050
The defined contribution plan fraction of .529 is calculated by di-
viding $58,225 by $110,050. Although it appears that the fraction
should be 1.0, because the corporation did make the maximum contri-
butions for the doctor to the money purchase plan for the two years
that it was in existence, the fraction is actually .529 because allyears of
service to the corporation are counted, regardless of when the plan
started.
Because the defined contribution plan fraction is only .529, the
maximum defined benefit plan fraction will be .871 (1.4-.529). There-
fore, in 1978, the corporation could institute a defined benefit plan and
provide Dr. Smith with a projected annual retirement benefit of
$78,520 (.871 x $90,150), using the highest limits allowed in 1978.112
This defined benefit of $78,520 is, of course, in addition to the defined
contribution plan's projected benefits. The combination of these two
In any case in which an individual is a participant in both a defined benefit plan
and a defined contribution plan maintained by the same employer, the sum of the
defined benefit plan fraction and the defined contribution plan fraction for any
year may not exceed 1.4.
Id. See also Krass & Keschner, How to Get the Most Effective Use Out of the "1.4 Rule", 4 J.
PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 473 (1978).
112. This result would be reached as follows: In 1978, the maximum limitation on the
annual retirement benefit that a participant could derive from a defined benefit plan was the
lesser of 100% of earned compensation or $90,150. The cost to fund this benefit would vary
from participant to participant because contributions under a defined benefit pension plan
depend upon a person's age and the reasonable actuarial assumptions, such as interest and
mortality rates, utilized by an actuary to calculate the cost. Whatever the amount of the
contribution, it will be deductible by the corporation, as will the amount contributed on
behalf of any participant's money purchase plan.
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types of plans and their respective benefits vividly demonstrates the
higher total benefits that can be obtained through the use of the "1.4
Rule." Obviously then, this method can be used to permissibly dis-
criminate in favor of incorporators, key employees and others whose
years of service prior to the defined contribution plan's installation will
allow them to have a lower defined contribution plan fraction and a
correspondingly higher level of defined plan benefits.
Combining a non-qualified plan 13 with a qualified plan provides
another method for permissible discrimination. 1 4 Under ERISA, ben-
efits from a qualified defined benefit plan may not exceed 100% of a
participant's average highest compensation over a continuous three
year period or $110,625, whichever is lower. 15 A non-qualified de-
ferred compensation plan can provide the desired additional retirement
income in excess of the limitations on qualified plans in order to make
up for the inadequacies of a broad-based qualified retirement plan.
Under a non-qualified plan, the employee-beneficiary will nor-
mally incur current tax liability 16 under the tax doctrines of construc-
tive receipt 1 7 or economic benefit. 18 However, in Revenue Ruling 60-
31, the IRS stated that deferred compensation is not taxable to the em-
ployee-beneficiary before actual receipt occurs, whether it is forfeitable
or non-forfeitable, provided: (1) the deferral is agreed to between the
employer and employee before the compensation is earned, (2) the de-
ferred amount is not unconditionally placed in trust or escrow for the
benefit of the employee, and (3) the promise to pay the deferred com-
pensation is merely a contractual obligation not evidenced by notes or
secured in any other manner. 19 Thus, if the employee is the contrac-
tual beneficiary, he/she is considered to have received a current "eco-
113. A non-qualified plan is a plan which does not receive the benefits of I.R.C. §§ 401-
415. As such, the employer cannot take advantage of current tax deductions for its advance
funding of the obligations and those contributions made to the employee's account will be
immediately taxed to the employee under the doctrines of constructive receipt or economic
benefit. See text accompanying notes 117-18 infra.
114. See Emering, "Top Hat"Penson Plans, 6 J. PENs. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 165 (1980).
115. $110,625 was the maximum limit for defined benefit plans in 1980. I.R.C.
§ 415(b)(1).
116. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.451-1(a) (1978), 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1973).
117. The doctrine of constructive receipt states that if a taxpayer could receive the income
at any time but elects to receive it later, he will still be taxed currently because he has a non-
forfeitable right to the income. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
118. The doctrine of economic benefit states that if a taxpayer is receiving a current bene-
fit he should be currently taxed on the value of that benefit. This concept embodies the
principles of "payment in kind" or "cash equivalent," where the benefit taxed is a non-cash
benefit. Rev. RuL 60-31 1960-1 C.B. 174.
119. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
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nomic benefit" and will incur current tax liability on the amount
expended or placed in trust. If, however, the employer is both the poli-
cyholder and the beneficiary, the income is not currently taxable to the
employee. Deferred compensation occurs because there is no guaran-
tee that the proceeds from these contracts will indeed be used to pay the
deferred compensation as it becomes due.
The combination of the progressive income tax system and a rising
inflation rate have posed a serious problem in providing executives
with an adequate income during their working years. Due to the high-
ly competitive job market and an extremely mobile employee work
force, the task of attracting and retaining competent executives has be-
come a cumbersome one. A non-qualified deferred compensation
plan120 can provide the desired additional retirement income in excess
of the limitations on qualified plans in order to make up for the inade-
quacies of a broad based qualified retirement plan. Thus, an Executive
Pension Plan (EPP) can provide an attractive part of an executive's to-
tal benefit package, giving employers who offer such a plan a competi-
tive edge over those who do not.
The existence of EPP programs has been given explicit recognition
under ERISA; 12 1 however, EPPs are not qualified tax programs.
122
Thus, advance funding of EPP obligations will not result in current tax
deductions and may subject the plan to a number of ERISA's reporting
and disclosure requirements which would not otherwise apply. 23 The
major advantage is that because EPPs do not qualify for any special
income tax considerations, coverage can be on a fully discriminatory
basis. Thus, EPP programs can be used to: 1) provide retirement bene-
fits in excess of current ERISA limits, 2) overcome the deficiencies of
the new corporation's broad based qualified plan, and 3) provide for
uniform treatment of the special retirement needs of senior executives,
including early retirement problems.
For example, a company president receiving $60,000 annual in-
come wishes to retire at 60. Under the corporation's defined benefit
120. In a non-qualified deferred compensation plan, the funds for the payment of benefits
must be set aside and invested prior to the retirement of the employee, and the employer
must be unable to use them in the ordinary course of its business. The trust instrument must
make it impossible for any such funds to be diverted for the employer's use at any time prior
to the satisfaction of all liabilities to the employees and their beneficiaries. I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2 (1964).
121. I.R.C. § 402(b).
122. Because EPPs are highly discriminatory, they do not meet the requirements of I.R.C.
§§ 401-415, which define qualified plans.
123. I.R.C. § 6058(a).
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plan, he is entitled to an annual accrued pension of $30,000 at age 65.
The plan's actuarial reduction feature, triggered by early retirement,
produces an actual benefit of only $20,000 per year at age 60. Without
EPP, the president would be limited to $20,000. With EPP, he may
receive supplemental benefits totaling the desired level of retirement
income equal, for example, to 75% of his final compensation or
$45,000.124 Thus, EPPs are aimed at providing higher retirement in-
come to key executives of an employer.
V. ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMINISTRATION OF ERISA
While some plans are rightfully disqualified as being too discrimi-
natory, the IRS, in its oversight function as the regulator of pension
plans, abuses its discretion by indiscriminantly disqualifying plans
which at any time fail to meet the legislative requirements of IRC sec-
tions 401 through 415. Employers who make innocent mistakes are as
subject to harsh treatment by the IRS as are the most blatant offend-
ers. 2' Effect is the only criteria and intent is never considered.
126
This problem occurs because a "legislature seeking to catch a par-
ticular abuse may find it necessary to cast a wider net,"' 27 thus causing
overbroad legislation. When this sweeping legislation is combined with
the IRS's frustration in attempting to catch employers who intention-
ally create discriminatory plans, as in Garland,28 there is an adminis-
124. 75% x $60,000 = $45,000. The executive will not qualify for Social Security benefits
until age 62, at which time he will be entitled to 80% of the $6,000 benefit payable at age 65
or $4,800. The EPP will provide an income of $25,000 for the first two years which will then
be reduced to $20,200 per year thereafter.
Source Amount
Defined Benefit Plan ......................................... $20,000
100% of Social Security Payable at age 62 ...................... 4,800
EPP Benefit ................................................. 20,200
Total $45,000
125. Scudere, Small Plans: No Place to Make an Innocent Mistake, 4 J. PENS. PLAN. &
COMPLIANCE 231 (1978).
126. E.g., Ludden v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 826 (1977), affid, 620 F.2d 700 (9th Cir.
1980). The Tax Court held that:
There is no provision in the Internal Revenue Code governing the retroactive cor-
rection of errors in the administration of employee plans. We therefore have no
statutory criteria for determining under what circumstances, if any, respondent
[Commissioner] might be considered to have abused his discretion in refusing to
deem a plan qualified if a retroactive correction of an inadvertent error in its oper-
ation were made.
Id. at 834 (footnote omitted).
127. Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d 390, 392 (2d Cir.
1968).
128. See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
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trative backlash which tends to be severe and often unfair.
In an effort to control the use of multiple corporations to avoid the
anti-discrimination provisions, IRC section 414 was passed. 129 Unfor-
tunately this legislation is overbroad. As a result, privately owned, un-
related businesses are attributed to one controlling group of owners
which causes the aggregation of all pension plans and triggers the re-
quirement that all employees of all the businesses be treated equally
under the plans.' 31 Consider, for example, a doctor, who is the sole
shareholder of a professional corporation which has a pension and
profit sharing plan for all of his corporate employees. He then buys a
fast-food franchise but does not institute a pension plan for that busi-
ness. Undoubtedly these are two different types of business; yet, sec-
tion 414(b) utilizes the definition of a brother-sister control group
contained in IRC section 1563(a)(2), causing the two corporations to be
linked for pension plan purposes. The professional corporation's pen-
sion plan would then be considered discriminatory because the lowest
paid medical employee covered by the plan would probably be more
highly paid than the highest paid franchise employee not covered by
the plan. Therefore, the professional corporation's plan would not op-
erate for a "fair cross section ' ' 13 1 of all employees of both corporations
because the franchise employees would not be covered, and thus the
plan would be deemed discriminatory and disqualified. Accordingly,
section 414 which was enacted by Congress to stem the ongoing inten-
tional abuses of the anti-discrimination provisions by employers is now
its own source for the abuse of others.
Considering the complexity of pension plans, innocent mistakes by
employers, as in the example above, are unavoidable. Yet, when Con-
gress authorized employers to make retroactive corrections for defects
under section 401(b), these corrections were limited to defects which
appear "on the face of the plan."' 32 Unintentional operational mis-
takes which make a plan discriminatory were not covered. Thus,
where a plan is "facially" correct, but an employer has unintentionally
129. H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8 (1974), reprintedin 1974-3 C.B. 244, 251.
130. Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2 (1975).
131. Eg., Forsyth Emergency Serv. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 881, 890 (1977) (retroactive
amendment to include more employees and escape disqualification held to be untimely and
not permissible even though amended prior to final IRS determination of plan's status);
Orthopaedic Assocs. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (improper opera-
tion of pension plan cannot be cured retroactively by funding contributions to eligible em-
ployees previously excluded).
132. I.R.C. § 401(b).
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omitted an employee, the IRS disqualifies the plan.'33 Even when the
employer has offered to correct the mistake retroactively, the IRS has
rejected the offer.'3 4 The result has been equally as harsh for employ-
ers who have voluntarily amended their plans before the mistake was
discovered by the IRS.135 Considering the effect that disqualification of
a pension plan has on all members of that plan, te., immediate taxa-
tion, this steadfast rejection of all substantive retroactive corrections
truly does not fulfill the "humanitarian" needs and goals espoused by
Congress in creating pension plans. To alleviate this abuse, operational
mistakes should be treated in the same manner as mistakes which ap-
pear "on the face" of the plan, unless an intent to discriminate is found.
VI. NEW ERISA LEGISLATION
On December 28, 1980, Congress passed a bill 136 which undoubt-
edly will have a profound impact in the area of pension plan planning.
The House Ways and Means Committee Report expressly stated that
the bill was aimed at stopping the use of multiple entities which
avoided the anti-discrimination requirements. 37 These requirements
were designed to benefit rank-and-file employees. Garland was cited
by the committee as epitomizing this type of abuse.'
38
Simply stated, this new provision requires that all employees who
are members of an affiliated service group be treated as employed by a
single employer when determining whether the employer's plan is dis-
criminatory. More specifically, an adjunct service (staff) corporation
139
will be treated as related140 to a specified service (executive) organiza-
133. Ludden v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 826 (1977), aft'd, 620 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1980);
Myron v. United States, 550 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1977).
134. Ludden v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. at 829.
135. Orthopaedic Assocs. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (plan
retroactively amended by corporation prior to IRS disqualification).
136. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 201, 94 Stat. 3526-27
(1980) (to be codified in I.R.C. § 414(m)).
137. H.R. REP. No. 1278, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1980); S. REP. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 32 (1980), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 11,609.
138. Id.
139. Id. An employer is an adjunct service or staff organization if a significant portion of
its business consists of performing services for a specified service or executive organization
and if the services provided by the staff organization are historically the kind performed by
employees of that type of executive organization.
140. Id. For purposes of determining whether the employee benefit requirements (I.R.C.
§§ 401(a)(3),(4),(7),(16), 410, 411, 415) are being satisfied in a non-discriminatory manner,
all employees of employers who are members of an affiliated service group are treated as if
they are employed by a single employer.
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tion 1" if (1) the executive organization regularly uses the services of the
staff organization or is regularly associated with it in performing serv-
ices for third persons, and (2) ten percent or more of the interests in the
staff organization is owned by persons who are officers, highly compen-
sated employees or owners of the executive organization.
14 2
This new provision effectively ends all types of Garland plans. No
longer will a partnership owned by two professionally incorporated
doctors, each owning 50%, qualify. The new test mandates that the
staff organization's employees be attributed to any corporation which
uses its services and has a 10% ownership interest in it either by direct
ownership or through indirect stockholder or key employee ownership.
Under the Garland type scheme, each executive corporation's 50% in-
terest in the staff corporation will cause the entities to be attributed,
which will cause each of the executive corporations' plans to be found
discriminatory and disqualified.
The above result is exactly what the IRS and Congress desired in
enacting IRC section 414(m).143 Unfortunately, this provision does
more than remedy abuses. Now, any organization which performs a
"significant" 144 amount of services for another organization will be at-
tributed if the second organization directly or indirectly owns 10% or
more of the first. For example, consider the situation where a small
incorporated secretarial service provides a fair amount of its total serv-
ices to a moderately sized law firm. Initially the two businesses are
totally unrelated; therefore, the law firm's pension plan would not be
expected to cover the secretarial service. However, suppose that subse-
quently, an associate of the law firm decides to buy a 10% interest in the
secretarial service as an investment. Because the associate is a highly
compensated employee owning 10% or more of the secretarial service,
the service's employees will now be attributed to the law firm for deter-
141. Id. An employer is a "specified service organization" (or executive organization) if
its principal business consists of the performance of specified services, that is, services in the
field of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts,
consulting or any other field designated in the Treasury Department's regulations as a field
in which separate organizations are being used to avoid the employee benefit requirements.
Thus, a "specified" service organization is really not very specified. It can basically be de-
fined as any service organization which attempts to use multiple entities to avoid the anti-
discrimination provisions.
142. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 201, 94 Stat. 3526-27
(1980) (to be codified in I.R.C. § 414(m)).
143. H.R. REP. No. 1278, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1980); S. REP. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 32 (1980), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 11,609.
144. The term "significant" provides no direction to a planner since it is currently unde-
fined. The IRS will undoubtedly define it, as it desires, in revenue rulings and/or regula-
tions in the years to come.
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mining the firm's pension plan's qualified status. Even if the firm's
original plan qualified under the IRC's anti-discrimination provisions,
the attribution of the lower paid secretarial service's employees, for
purposes of determining the firm's plan's qualified status, will cause the
plan to be disqualified as discriminatory.145 This result will occur even
though the two organizations are separate and independent, had no
common ownership for a period of years, became affiliated through a
highly compensated employee's inadvertent buy-in, and were not cre-
ated as separate entities for the purpose of pension plan discrimination.
The inability of the new provision to account for organizations
which are in "form" affiliated, under the provision's test, but which are
in "substance" or reality unrelated is a major pitfall in the legislation.
However, Congress was aware of this pitfall. The proposed statute sub-
mitted to Congress by the Tax Section of the American Bar Association
(ABA), prior to the passage of the provision, specifically addressed this
shortcoming:
[Tihe [above] provisions. . . shall not apply to any organiza-
tion which otherwise would be aggregated with one or more
other organizations, if such organization was notformed or
availed of and is not maintainedprimariy for the purpose of
excluding employees . . . from participation in its qualified
. . . plans. (emphasis added).
146
However, Congress failed to see the logic of the ABA's subjective test.
The ABA provision would have given the employer a right to defend
and preserve the qualified status of its plan upon an affirmative show-
ing that the primary purpose of the multiple corporate structure was
not to exclude the staff employees from the employer's plan. Instead,
Congress enacted a statute which will effectively disqualify numerous
plans which inadvertently become affiliated under the provision's low
10% ownership test. Apparently, Congress felt it was better to purge
the pension area of all employers, even innocent ones, who violate this
new provision.
145. The example assumes that the secretarial service does not have a pension plan. If
the secretarial service did have a plan, the two organizations would still be aggregated and
the firm's pension plan, standing alone, would be checked to see if it satisfied the coverage
requirements of§ 410(b)(1). If the coverage for the employees of both organizations was not
sufficient, the plans of the two organizations would be compared to determine whether the
benefits or contributions under the respective plans were discriminatory. For determining
the comparability of two qualified plans, see Rev. Rul. 74-165, 1974-1 C.B. 96 and Rev. Rul.
74-166, 1974-1 C.B. 97.
146. ABA COMM. ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION No. I
(Nov. 21, 1980) (draft).
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A second shortcoming of this new provision is the subjective "sig-
nificant portion" test. Under the provision, for a staff organization to
be attributed to an executive organization, the IRS must find that a
"significant portion" of the business of the staff organization is for the
performance of services for the executive organization. Nowhere, how-
ever, is the phrase "significant portion" defined. The Tax Section of
the ABA, in its proposed statute, concluded that an objective affiliation
test should be used, rather than a subjective one. The ABA recom-
mended that two entities be deemed affiliated, which would cause the
employees of the staff organization to be attributed to the executive
organization, if "more than 50% of the aggregate goods and services" of
the staff organization were sold to the executive organization or more
than 50% of the aggregate goods and services acquired by the staff or-
ganization were from the executive organization.14 7 However, Con-
gress rejected this suggestion, possibly because of the Garland-type
schemes which easily evaded the anti-discriminatory provisions by
manipulating an objective test. 48 Unfortunately though, by selecting a
subjective test like "significant portion," Congress gave tax planners
little guidance concerning the meaning of "significant." Thus, Con-
gress, through its own action, has basically invited litigation over this
term.
Given the parameters of section 414(m), there appear to be few
methods for avoiding it. One method is to structure the ownership of
the staff organization so that no shareholder or highly compensated
employee of the executive organization owns 10% or more of the staff
organization. The result would be that those owners similar to Dr.
- Garland would now have to join forces with ten other doctors in own-
ing a staff organization to avoid being deemed affiliated.
A second method of avoidance would require the alteration of the
existing contractual relationships between the executive organization
and the staff organization. Under the new provision, a staff organiza-
tion is only attributed if a "significant portion of (its) business. . . is
the performance of services" for an executive organization. Under this
second method, the staff organization would perform no contractual
services for the executive organization. Rathef, the executive organiza-
tion, which is usually a professional corporation, would be contracted
to work for the staff corporation. The office suite and all equipment
147. Id.
148. I.R.C. § 414(b) requires that an adjunct organization be attributed to a service or-
ganization if more than 50% of the adjunct is owned by the service organization or one of its
shareholders. Dr. Garland evaded this objective test by owning exactly 50%6.
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would be purchased by each professional corporation and then leased
to the staff organization. Technically, the professional corporations
would still be the executive organizations because they own the means
of doing business (leased equipment, etc.), and the employee organiza-
tion would still be the staff organization. However, because this con-
tractual alteration is in fact a scheme which merely disguises the same
transaction that the statute was designed to stop, undoubtedly the Sec-
retary of the Treasury will issue a regulation to stop this scheme.149
In conclusion, this new provision appears to provide none of the
obvious loopholes for intentionally discriminating employers as did
I.R.C. section 414(b).'5 0 Unfortunately, this provision also provides no
leeway for employers who innocently and inadvertently violate it. In
this regard, it suffers from the same defect as the old legislation. Addi-
tionally, it does not provide the planner with any objective tests or gui-
dance on how to interpret the vague key phrases of its subjective tests.
From a practitioner's standpoint, this provision provides little guidance
for planning and is only a cause for concern.
VII. PLANNING
Integration of Social Security with qualified plans is still the most
viable means for achieving permissible discrimination. Structured cor-
rectly, integration will provide the prohibited group (key employees
and other highly compensated employees) with a disproportionate
amount of benefits over the Social Security base.' Especially where
employees have multiple employers using the "offset" method of inte-
gration, the pension reductions to the employee's account can exceed
the amount of Social Security payments, allowing the prohibited group
an even larger share of the benefits. 52
Vesting standards combined with forfeitures also provide a plan-
ning method for permissible discrimination.' The vesting standard
for a plan can still be chosen on the basis of employee turnover. Pro-
posed regulation section 1.411 (d)-1 154 only disqualifies a plan if the dif-
ference between the benefits accrued to the prohibited group and to the
149. Under § 414(m)(6), the Secretary is given the power to prescribe regulations as nec-
essary to prevent the avoidance of this section.
150. E.g., Garland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 5 (1979). See note 149 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 92-101 supra.
152. See note 9 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 103-07 supra.
154. 45 Fed. Reg. 39869 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 24201 (1980).
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lower employees is "unreasonable." In short, the key to planning is not
to be greedy.
Structuring an employer's workpool so that lower positions are
filled with employees who are within five years of the plan's retirement
age provides another means of permissible discrimination. Employees
who are within five years of retirement need not be included in pension
plans.' 55 The result is that pension benefits will be more heavily con-
centrated in the prohibited group because fewer lower employees will
be eligible.
Combining defined benefit plans with defined contribution plans
and utilizing the "1.4 Rule" provides another mode for permissible dis-
crimination in planning.156 This method is particularly effective when
the executives and other highly compensated employees were members
of the organization near the time of its incorporation, when no defined
contribution plan existed. Because the defined contribution fraction
takes into account allyears of service, the executives will have a lower
defined contribution to years of service ratio. This results in executives
receiving higher defined benefts, since their "defined benefit" percent-
age will be reduced by the lower "defined contribution" percentage.
15 7
Non-qualified Executive Pension Plans, when combined with
qualified plans and integrated with Social Security, also provide the
planner with a source of permissible discrimination."5 ' EPPs, when not
placed in the employee's constructive or actual possession, avoid cur-
rent taxation. Because these plans are not subject to ERISA's discrimi-
nation provisions, they can be as discriminatory as the planner desires.
Eligibility should be based on position or title rather than on income,
because inflation will push incomes upward and other employees, not
intended for EPP coverage, may qualify.
Lastly, and most importantly, the Garland-type scheme is no
longer apermissible source of discrimination. Section 414(m) has effec-
tively put an end to the impermissible discrimination that was being
practiced by such arrangements under section 414(b).
Therefore, the best permissible means of discrimination is still in-
tegration. It can be coupled with other pernAssible mechanisms, such
as long vesting schedules, to provide the executives with additional dis-
criminatory benefits.
155. See text accompanying notes 108-12 supra.
156. Id.
157. See text accompanying notes 113-25 supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 54-67 supra.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In pension planning, there are permissible and impermissible
means by which discrimination in favor of executives, officers, and
other highly compensated employees can be achieved. Although the
intent of this comment was not to suggest that all employers should
amend their plans to be more discriminatory, the realities of the busi-
ness world demand that methods be found. For the small businessman
who risked his capital, health, sanity and hairline in creating his busi-
ness, it seems rather unjust that under the Social Security system and
ERISA he should receive a proportionately smaller amount than his
hired help. For the businessman struggling to compete for new man-
agement personnel, it also seems odd that under present law he cannot
offer higher retirement benefits without being required to spend addi-
tional sums for the retirement funds of the rank and file. Congress'
purpose in providing for private pension plans was to increase the ben-
efits received by employees. Disqualification for the disproportionate
allocation of benefits made after the Social Security base is covered
seems ludicrous. The cost-benefit analysis of ERISA is tilting towards
cost, which will result in fewer plans being instituted. Incentives for the
creation of pension plans are needed, and permissible discrimination in
planning provides such a source.
Timothy A Greenleaf
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